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Abstract
We build a natural connection between the learning problem, co-training, and forecast
elicitation without verification (related to peer-prediction) and address them simultaneously
using the same information theoretic approach.1
In co-training/multiview learning [6] the goal is to aggregate two views of data into a prediction
for a latent label. We show how to optimally combine two views of data by reducing the problem
to an optimization problem. Our work gives a unified and rigorous approach to the general
setting.
In forecast elicitation without verification we seek to design a mechanism that elicits high
quality forecasts from agents in the setting where the mechanism does not have access to the
ground truth. By assuming the agents’ information is independent conditioning on the outcome,
we propose mechanisms where truth-telling is a strict equilibrium for both the single-task and
multi-task settings. Our multi-task mechanism additionally has the property that the truth-
telling equilibrium pays better than any other strategy profile and strictly better than any other
“non-permutation" strategy profile when the prior satisfies some mild conditions.
1 Introduction
Co-training/multiview learning is a problem that asks to aggregate two views of data into a prediction
for the latent label, and was first proposed by Blum and Mitchell [6]. Although co-training is an
important learning problem, it lacks a unified and rigorous approach to the general setting. The
current paper will make an innovative connection between the co-training problem and a peer
prediction style mechanism design problem: forecast elicitation without verification, and develop a
unified theory for both of them via the same information theoretic approach.
We use “forecasting whether a startup company will succeed” as our running example. We have
two possible sources of information for each startup: the features XA (e.g. products, business idea,
target customer) of the startup; and the survey feedback XB , collected from the crowd (e.g. a survey
of amateur investors). Sometimes we have access to both the sources, and sometimes we have access
to only one of the sources. We want to learn how to forecast the result Y (succeed/fail) of a startup
company, using both or one of the sources.
We are given a set predictor candidates {PA} (e.g. a set of hypotheses) such that each predictor
candidate PA maps the features XA to a forecast for the result Y of the startup (e.g. succeed with
73% probability, fail with 27% probability). We are also given a set predictor candidates {PB}
(e.g. a set of aggregation algorithms like majority vote/weighted average) such that each predictor
candidate PB maps the survey feedback XB to a forecast for the result Y . Our goal is to evaluate
the performance of a specific pair PA, PB. The learning problem, learning how to forecast, can be
1This work is supported by the National Science Foundation, under grant CAREER#1452915, CCF#1618187 and
AitF#1535912.
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reduced to this goal since if we know how to evaluate the two candidates PA, PB’s performance, we
can select the two candidates P ∗A, P ∗B which have the highest performance and use them to forecast.
Given a batch of past startup data each with the features XA, the crowdsourced feedback
XB, and the result Y , we can evaluate the performance of the predictors through many existing
measurements (e.g. proper scoring rules, loss functions). This evaluation method is related to the
supervised learning setting. However, there may be only very few data points about the startups
with results Y .2 When we only use a few labeled data points to train the predictor, the predictor
will likely over-fit. Thus, we can boldly ask:
(*Learning) Can we evaluate the performance of the predictor candidates, as well as learn how to
forecast the ground truth Y , without access to any data labeled with Y ? (See Figure 1)
Figure 1: Problem (*): Finding the common ground truth
It is impossible to solve this problem without making an additional assumption on the relationship
between XA,XB and Y . However, it turns out we can solve this problem with a natural assumption,
conditioning on Y , XA and XB are independent. This assumption states that Y contains all common
information between XA and XB (see Section 3 for more discussion).
With this assumption, a naive approach is to learn the joint distribution of XA and XB using
the past data, and then solve the relationship between Y and XA,XB by some calculations, using
the fact that XA and XB are independent conditioning on Y . However, this naive approach will
not work if either XA or XB has very high dimension. We will address this issue using learning
methods. Before we go further on the learning problem, let’s consider a corresponding mechanism
design problem. In the scenario where the forecasts are provided by human beings, we want to ask a
mechanism design problem:
(**Mechanism design) Can we design proper instant reward schemes to incentivize high quality
forecast for Y without instant access to Y ? (See Figure 2)
People will obtain instant payments from instant reward schemes. If we do not require the
reward schemes to be instant, proper scoring rules will work by rewarding people in the future
after Y is revealed. It turns out the above learning problem (*) and mechanism design problem
(**) are essentially the same, since there is a natural correspondence between an evaluation of their
performance and their rewards. The mechanism design applications still require the conditional
independent assumption. To address the two problems, a first try would be rewarding the predictors
according to their “agreement”, since high quality predictors should have a lot of agreement with
each other. However, if we train the predictors based on this criterion, then the output of the
training process will be two meaningless constant predictors which perfectly agree with each other
(e.g. always forecast 100% success). We call this problem the “naive agreement” issue.
2For example, if we focus on cryptographic or self-driving currencies, there are very few startups labeled with
results.
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Figure 2: Problem (**): Forecast elicitation
Note that the mechanism design problem (**) is closely related to the peer prediction literature,
incentivizing high quality information reports without verification. It is natural to leverage the
techniques and insights from peer prediction to address problems (*) and (**). In fact, the peer
prediction literature provides an information theoretic idea to address the “naive agreement” issue,
that is, replacing “agreement” by mutual information. In the current paper, we will show that with
a natural assumption, conditioning on Y , XA, and XB are independent, we can address problem (*)
and (**) simultaneously via rewarding the predictors the mutual information between them and
using the predictors’ reward as the evaluation of their performance.
Our contribution We build a natural connection between mechanism design and machine learning
by simultaneously addressing a learning problem and a mechanism design problem in the context
where ground truth is unknown, via the same information theoretic approach.
Learning We focus on the co-training problem [6]: learning how to forecast Y using two sources
of information XA and XB, without access to any data labeled with ground truth Y (Sec-
tion 3). By making a typical assumption in the co-training literature, conditioning on Y ,
XA and XB are independent, we reduce the learning problem to an optimization problem
maxPA,PBMIG
f(PA, PB) such that solving the learning problem is equivalent to picking the
P ∗A, P ∗B that maximizeMIGf(PA, PB), i.e., the f -mutual information gain between PA and PB
(Section 4). Formally, we define the Bayesian posterior predictor as the predictor that maps
any input information X = x to its Bayesian posterior forecast for Y = y, i.e., Pr(Y = y∣X = x).
Then when both PA, PB are Bayesian posterior predictors, MIGf(PA, PB) is maximized and
the maximal value is the f -mutual information between XA and XB . With an additional mild
restriction on the prior, MIGf(PA, PB) is maximized if and only if both PA, PB are permuted
versions of the Bayesian posterior predictor.
We also design another family of optimization goals, PS-gain3, based on the family of proper
scoring rules (Section 6). We can also reduce the learning problem to the PS-gain optimization
problem. We will show a special case of the PS-gain, picking PS as the logarithmic scoring rule
LSR, corresponds to the maximum likelihood estimator method. The range of applications
of PS-gain is more limited when compared with the range of applications of the f -mutual
information gain, since the application of PS-gain requires either one of the information sources
to be low dimensional or that we have a simple generative model for the distribution over one
of the information sources and ground truth labels, while the f -mutual information gain does
not have these restrictions.
3PS is a proper scoring rule.
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As is typical in related literature, we do not investigate the computation complexity or data
requirement of the learning problem.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first optimization goal in the co-training literature that
guarantees that the maximizer corresponds to the Bayesian posterior predictor, without any
additional assumption. Thus, our method optimally aggregates the two sources of information.
Mechanism design Consider the scenario where we elicit forecasts for ground truth Y from agents
and pay agents immediately. Without access to Y , given the prior on the distribution of Y ,
i.e., Pr[Y ], 4 by assuming agents’ private information are independent conditioning on Y
and the prior satisfies some mild conditions, in the single-task setting (there is only a single
forecasting task), we design a strictly truthful mechanism, the common ground mechanism,
where truth-telling is a strict equilibrium (Section 5.2); in the multi-task (there are at least
two a priori similar forecasting tasks) setting, we design a family of focal mechanisms, the
multi-task common ground mechanism MCG(f)s, where the truth-telling equilibrium pays
better than any other strategy profile and strictly higher than any non-permutation strategy
profile (Section 5.1).
Technical contribution Our main technical ingredient is a novel performance measurement, the
f -mutual information gain, which is an unbiased estimator of the f -mutual information. To give a
flavor of this measurement, we give an informal presentation here: both PA and PB are assigned a
batch of forecasting tasks, the f -mutual information gain between PA and PB is
The agreements between PA’s forecast and PB’s forecast for the same task− f⋆(The agreements between PA’s forecast and PB’s forecast for different tasks)
Figure 3: An unbiased estimator of f -mutual information: f -mutual information gain. PA and
PB are assigned three forecasting tasks. PA’s outputs are (0.7,0.3), (0.1,0.9), (0.5,0.5) and PB’s
outputs are (0.6, 0.4), (0.2, 0.8), (0.4, 0.6). To calculate the f -mutual information gain between them,
we pick a task (e.g. Task no. 2) uniformly at random and calculate the “agreement" as between PA
and PB ’s forecasts for this task; we also pick a pair of distinct tasks (i, j) uniformly at random (e.g.
(Task no. 1, Task no. 2)) and calculate the “agreement" ad between PA’s forecast for task i and PB ’s
forecast for this task j. The f -mutual information gain is then as − f⋆(ad). The formal definition
(Section 4.1) actually uses the empirical expectations of as and f⋆(ad).
where f⋆ is the conjugate of the convex function f . With this measurement, two agreeing
constant predictors have small gain since their outputs have large agreements for both the same
task and different tasks. The formal definition will be introduced in Section 4.1 and the agreement
measure is introduced in Definition 4.2.
4This is not a very strong assumption since we do not need the knowledge of the joint distribution over the event
and agents’ private information.
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The f -mutual information gain is conceptually similar to the correlation payment scheme proposed
by Dasgupta and Ghosh [13] (in the binary choice setting), and Shnayder et al. [38] (in the multiple
choice setting), which pays agents “the agreement for the same task minus the agreement for
the distinct task”. In Dasgupta and Ghosh [13] and Shnayder et al. [38], the payment scheme is
designed for discrete signals and the measure of agreements is a simple indicator function. Kong and
Schoenebeck [21] show that this correlation payment is related to a special f -mutual information.
Thus, the f -mutual information gain can be seen as an extension of the correlation payment scheme
that works for forecast reports.
1.1 Applications
In our startup running example, we consider the situation where one source of information is the
features and another source of information is the crowdsourced feedback. In fact, our results apply
to all kinds of information sources. For example, we can make both sources features or crowdsourced
feedback. Different setups for the information sources and predictor candidates can bring different
applications of our results.
Let’s consider the “learning with noisy labels” problem where the labels in the training data are
a noisy version of the ground truth labels Y and the noise is independent. We can map this problem
into our framework by letting XB be the noisy label of features XA. That is, XB is a noisy version of
Y . Our framework guarantees that the Bayesian posterior predictor that forecasts Y using XA must
be part of a maximizer of the optimization problem. However, there are many other maximizers.
For example, since XA and XB are independent conditioning XB . The Bayesian posterior predictor
that forecasts XB using XA is also part of a maximizer, since the scenario Y = XB also satisfies
the conditional independence assumption. If XB has much higher dimension than Y , we do not
have this issue. But XB has the same signal space with Y in the learning with noisy label problem.
Thus, it’s impossible to eliminate other maximizers without any side information here. With some
side information (e.g. a candidate set F , like linear regressions, that only contains our desired
maximizer.), it’s possible to obtain the Bayesian posterior predictor that forecasts Y using XA. Note
that our framework does not require a pre-estimation on the transition probability that transits the
ground truth label Y to the noisy ground truth label XB, since our framework has this transition
probability, which corresponds to the predictor PB, as parameters as well and learns the correct
forecaster PA and the transition probability PB simultaneously.
Ratner et al. [34] propose a method to collect massive labels by asking the crowds to write
heuristics to label the instances. Each instance is associated with many noisy labels outputted by
the heuristics. In their setting, the crowds use a different source of information from the learning
algorithm (e.g. the learning algorithm uses the biology description of the genes and the crowds use
the scientific papers about the gene). Thus, the conditional independence assumption is natural here
and we can map this setting’s training problem into our framework. Ratner et al. [34] preprocess the
collected labels to approximate ground truth by assuming a particular information structure model
on the crowds. Our framework is model-free and does not need to preprocess the collected labels
since we can learn the best forecaster (predictor PA) and the best processing/aggregation algorithm
(predictor PB) simultaneously.
Moreover, since the highest evaluation value of the predictors PA, PB is the f -mutual information
between XA and XB , our results provide a method to calculate the f -mutual information between any
two sources of information XA,XB of any format. Kong and Schoenebeck [21] propose a framework
for designing information elicitation mechanisms that reward truth-telling by paying each agent the
f -mutual information between her report and her peers’ report. Thus, the f -mutual information
gain method can be combined with this framework to design information elicitation mechanisms
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when the information has a complicated format.
1.2 Related work
Learning Co-training/multiview learning was first proposed by Blum and Mitchell [6] and explored
by many works (e.g. Dasgupta et al. [14], Collins and Singer [9]). Xu et al. [42], Li et al. [23] give
surveys on this literature. Although co-training is an important learning problem, it lacks a unified
theory and a solid theoretic guarantee for the general model. Most traditional co-training methods
require additional restrictions on the hypothesis space (e.g. weakly good hypotheses) to address the
“naive agreement” issue and fail to deal with soft hypotheses. Soft hypotheses output a continuous
signal (as opposed to hard hypothesis which output a discrete signal) and are typically required to
fully aggregate the information from two sources. Becker [4] deals with a feature learning problem
which is very similar to the co-training problem. Becker [4] seeks to maximize the Shannon mutual
information between the output of two functions. However, their work only considers hard (not soft)
hypotheses and lacks a solid theoretic analysis for the maximizer. Kakade and Foster [18] consider
the multi-view regression and maximize the correlation between the two hypotheses. Their method
captures the “mutual information” idea (in fact, correlation is a special f -mutual information [21])
but their model has a very specific set up and the analysis cannot be extended to other co-training
problems.
In contrast, we propose a simple, powerful and general information theoretic framework, f -mutual
information gain, that has a solid theoretic guarantee, works for soft hypothesis and addresses the
“naive agreement” issue without any additional assumption.
Natarajan et al. [28], Sukhbaatar and Fergus [39] and many other works (e.g. Angluin and Laird
[3], Khardon and Wachman [20], Scott et al. [37]) consider the learning with noisy labels problem.
Natarajan et al. [28] consider binary labels and calibrate the original loss function such that the
Bayesian posterior predictor that forecasts ground truth Y is a maximizer of the calibrated loss.
Sukhbaatar and Fergus [39] extend this work to the multiclass setting. These works require additional
estimation steps to learn the transition probability that transits the ground truth labels to the noisy
labels and fix this transition probability in their calibration step. In contrast, by mapping this
problem into our framework (Section 1.1), we do not need the additional estimation steps to make the
calibrated forecaster part of a maximizer of our optimization problem, and can incorporate any kind
of side information to learn the calibrated forecaster and true transition probability simultaneously.
Moreover, our results can handle more complicated setting where each instance is labeled by
multiple labels. Rather than preprocessing the labels by a particular algorithm (e.g. majority vote,
weighted average, spectral method) and assuming some information structure model among the
crowds [34], our framework is model-free and can learn the best calibrated forecaster (predictor PA)
and the best processing algorithm (predictor PB) simultaneously.
Raykar et al. [35] also jointly learn the calibrated forecaster and the distribution over the crowd-
sourced feedback and ground truth labels. Raykar et al. [35] uses the maximum likelihood estimator
and assumes a simple generative model for the distribution over the crowdsourced feedback and
the ground truth labels, which is conditioning the ground truth label, the crowdsourced feedback is
drawn from a binomial distribution, while our framework is model-free. We also extend the maximum
likelihood estimator method in Raykar et al. [35] to a general family of estimators, PS-gain estimators,
based on the family of proper scoring rules, which also jointly learn the calibrated forecaster and the
distribution. We will show the range of applications of PS-gain is more limited compared with the
range of applications of the f -mutual information gain (see Section 6.3 for more details). Cid-Sueiro
[8] also uses proper scoring rules to design the loss functions that address the learning with noisy
labels problem. However, Cid-Sueiro [8] designs a different family of loss functions from the PS-gain
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and cannot jointly learn the calibrated forecaster and the distribution.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [17] combine game theory and learning theory to make
innovative progress. We also combine game theory and learning theory by proposing a peer prediction
game between two predictors. The game in GAN is a zero-sum competitive game while the game in
the current paper is collaborative.
Several learning problems (e.g. finding the pose of an object in an image [5], blind source
separation [7], feature selection [32]) use mutual information maximization (infomax) as their
optimization goal. Some of these problems require data labeled with ground truth and some of them
have a very different problem set up than our work.
We borrow the techniques about the duality of f -divergence from Nguyen et al. [29, 30]. Nguyen
et al. [29] show a correspondence between the f -divergence and the surrogate loss in the binary
supervised learning setting and Nguyen et al. [30] propose a way to estimate the f -divergence between
two high dimensional random variables. We apply the duality of f -divergence to an unsupervised
learning problem and not restricted to the binary setting.
We also differ from the crowdsourcing literature that infers ground truth answers from agents’
reports (e.g. [44, 19, 43, 12]) in the sense that their agents’ reports are a simple choice (e.g. A, B, C,
D) while in our setting, the report can come from a space larger than the space of ground truth
answers, perhaps even a very high dimensional vector.
Mechanism design Our mechanism design setting differ from the traditional peer prediction
literature (e.g.[27, 33, 13, 21, 38]) since we are eliciting forecast rather than a simple signal. We can
discretize the forecast report and apply the traditional peer prediction literature results. However,
this will only provide approximated truthfulness and fail to design focal mechanisms which pay truth-
telling strictly better than any other non-permutation equilibrium since the forecast is discretized,
while our mechanisms are focal for ≥2 tasks setting.
Witkowski et al. [41] consider the forecast elicitation situation and assume that they have an
unbiased estimator of the optimal forecast while we assume an additional conditional independence
assumption but do not need the unbiased estimator.
Liu and Chen [24, 25] connect mechanism design with learning by using the learning methods
to design peer prediction mechanisms. In the setting where several agents are asked to label a
batch of instances, Liu and Chen [24] design a peer prediction mechanism where each agent is paid
according to her answer and a reference answer generated by a classification algorithm using other
agents’ reports. Liu and Chen [25] also use surrogate loss functions as tools to develop a multi-task
mechanism that achieves truthful elicitation in dominant strategy when the mechanism designer
only has access to agents’ reports. Instead of using learning methods to design the peer prediction
mechanisms, our work uses peer prediction mechanism design techniques to address a learning
problem. Moreover, our mechanism design problem has a very different set up from Liu and Chen
[24, 25]. Agarwal and Agarwal [1] connect learning theory with information elicitation by showing
the equivalence between the calibrated surrogate losses in supervised learning and the elicitation of
certain properties of the underlying conditional label distribution. Both our learning problem and
mechanism design problem have a very different set up from theirs.
Independent work Like the current paper, McAllester [26] also uses Shannon mutual information
to propose an information theoretic training objective that can deal with soft hypotheses/classifiers.
However, the optimization functions from these two works are different. We also use a more general
information measure, f -mutual information, which has Shannon mutual information as a special case,
and provide a formal analysis for this general framework. Additionally, we propose an innovative
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connection between co-training and peer prediction.
2 Preliminaries
Given a finite set [N] ∶= {1,2, ...,N}, for any function φ ∶ [N]↦ R, we use (φ(y))y∈[N] to represent
the vector (φ(1), φ(2), ..., φ(N)) ∈ RN . Given a finite set Σ, ∆Σ is the set of all distributions over Σ.
2.1 f-divergence and Fenchel’s duality
f-divergence [2, 11] f -divergence Df ∶ ∆Σ×∆Σ ↦ R is a non-symmetric measure of the difference
between distribution p ∈ ∆Σ and distribution q ∈ ∆Σ and is defined to be
Df(p,q) = ∑
σ∈Σp(σ)f(q(σ)p(σ))
where f ∶ R↦ R is a convex function and f(1) = 0.
Here we introduce two f -divergences in common use: KL divergence, and Total Variance Distance.
Example 2.1 (KL divergence). Choosing − log(x) as the convex function f(x), f -divergence becomes
KL divergence DKL(p,q) = ∑σ p(σ) log p(σ)q(σ)
Example 2.2 (Total Variance Distance). Choosing ∣x− 1∣ as the convex function f(x), f -divergence
becomes Total Variance Distance Dtvd(p,q) = ∑σ ∣p(σ) − q(σ)∣
Definition 2.3 (Fenchel Duality [36]). Given any function f ∶ R↦ R, we define its convex conjugate
f⋆ as a function that also maps R to R such that
f⋆(x) = sup
t
tx − f(t).
Lemma 2.4 (Dual version of f -divergence [29, 30]).
Df(p,q) ≥ sup
u∈Σ Epu −Eqf⋆(u) = supu∈G∑σ u(σ)p(σ) −∑σ f⋆(u(σ))q(σ)
where G is a set of functions that maps Σ to R. The equality holds if and only if u(σ) = u∗(σ) ∈
∂f(p(σ)q(σ)), i.e., the subdifferential of f on value p(σ)q(σ) .
We call (u∗, f⋆(u∗)) a pair of best disinguishers. This dual version of f -divergence is introduced
by Nguyen et al. [29] and also plays a key role in the design of a type of generative adversarial
networks, f -GANs [31].
2.2 f-mutual information
Given two random variables X,Y whose realization space are ΣX and ΣY , let UX,Y and VX,Y be
two probability measures where UX,Y is the joint distribution of (X,Y ) and VX,Y is the product of
the marginal distributions of X and Y . Formally, for every pair of (x, y) ∈ ΣX ×ΣY ,
UX,Y (X = x,Y = y) = Pr[X = x,Y = y] VX,Y (X = x,Y = y) = Pr[X = x]Pr[Y = y].
If UX,Y is very different from VX,Y , the mutual information between X and Y should be high
since knowing X changes the belief for Y a lot. If UX,Y equals to VX,Y , the mutual information
between X and Y should be zero since X is independent with Y . Intuitively, the “distance” between
UX,Y and VX,Y represents the mutual information between them.
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f -divergence f(t) u∗(x, y) = ∂f(K(x, y)) f⋆(u∗(x, y))
Total Variation Distance ∣t − 1∣ sign(logK(x, y)) sign(logK(x, y))
KL divergence t log t 1 + logK(x, y) K(x, y)
Reverse KL − log t − 1K(x,y) −1 + logK(x, y))
Pearson χ2 (t − 1)2 2(K(x, y) − 1) (K(x, y))2 − 1
Squared Hellinger (√t − 1)2 1 −√ 1K(x,y) √K(x, y) − 1
Table 1: Reference for common f -divergences and corresponding pairs of best distinguishers(u∗(x, y), f⋆(u∗(x, y)) of f -mutual information. K(x, y) =K(X = x,Y = y) (PMI).
Definition 2.5 (f -mutual information [21]). The f -mutual information between X and Y is defined
as
MIf(X;Y ) =Df(UX,Y ,VX,Y )
where Df is f -divergence. f -mutual information is always non-negative [21].
f -mutual information is used in the peer prediction literature since if the information is measured
by f -mutual information, any “data processing” on either of the random variables will decrease the
amount of information crossing them. Thus, in peer prediction, if we pay agents according to the
f -mutual information between her information and her peers’ information, agents will be incentivized
to report all information to maximize their payments5.
Two examples of f -mutual information are Shannon mutual information [10] (Choosing f -
divergence as KL divergence) and MItvd(X;Y ) ∶= ∑x,y ∣Pr[X = x,Y = y] − Pr[X = x]Pr[Y = y]∣
(Choosing f -divergence as Total Variation Distance).
We define K(X = x,Y = y) as the ratio between UX,Y (x, y) and VX,Y (x, y), i.e.,
K(X = x,Y = y) ∶= Pr[X = x,Y = y]
Pr[X = x]Pr[Y = y] = Pr[Y = y∣X = x]Pr[Y = y] = Pr[X = x∣Y = y]Pr[X = x] .
K(X = x,Y = y) represents the “pointwise mutual information(PMI)” between X = x and Y = y.
Lemma 2.4 directly implies:
Lemma 2.6 (Dual version of f -mutual information).
MIf(X;Y ) ≥ sup
u∈G EUX,Y u −EVX,Y f⋆(u)
where G is a set of functions that maps ΣX ×ΣY to R.
The equality holds if and only if u(x, y) = u∗(x, y) ∈ ∂f(K(X = x,Y = y)).
2.3 Proper scoring rules
A scoring rule PS ∶ Σ × ∆Σ ↦ R [40, 16] takes in a signal σ ∈ Σ and a distribution over signals
p ∈ ∆Σ and outputs a real number. A scoring rule is proper if, whenever the first input is drawn
from a distribution p, then p will maximize the expectation of PS over all possible inputs in ∆Σ to
the second coordinate. A scoring rule is called strictly proper if this maximum is unique. We will
5In the current paper, we do not directly use the data processing inequality of f -mutual information. Thus, we
omit the formal introduction here. The interested reader is refer to Kong and Schoenebeck [21].
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assume throughout that the scoring rules we use are strictly proper. Slightly abusing notation, we
can extend a scoring rule to be PS ∶ ∆Σ ×∆Σ ↦ R by simply taking PS(p,q) = Eσ←p(σ,q). We
note that this means that any proper scoring rule is linear in the first term.
Example 2.7 (Log Scoring Rule [40, 16]). Fix an outcome space Σ for a signal σ. Let q ∈ ∆Σ be a
reported distribution. The Logarithmic Scoring Rule maps a signal and reported distribution to a
payoff as follows:
LSR(σ,q) = log(q(σ)).
Let the signal σ be drawn from some random process with distribution p ∈ ∆Σ.
Then the expected payoff of the Logarithmic Scoring Rule
Eσ←p[LSR(σ,q)] =∑
σ
p(σ) logq(σ) = LSR(p,q)
This value will be maximized if and only if q = p.
2.4 Property of the pointwise mutual information
We will introduce a simple property of the pointwise mutual information that we will use multiple
times in the future. In addition to several different formats of the pointwise mutual information
(e.g. joint distribution/product of the marginal distributions, posterior/prior), if there exists a
latent random variable Y such that random variable XA and random variable XB are independent
conditioning on Y , we can also represent the pointwise mutual information between XA and XB by
the “agreement” between the “relationship” between XA and Y , and the “relationship” between XB
and Y .
Claim 2.8. When random variables XA, XB are independent conditioning on Y ,
K(XA = xA,XB = xB) =∑
y
Pr[Y = y]K(XA = xA, Y = y)K(XB = xB, Y = y)
=∑
y
Pr[Y = y∣XA = xA]K(XB = xB, Y = y)
=∑
y
Pr[Y = y∣XA = xA]Pr[Y = y∣XB = xB]
Pr[Y = y] .
We defer the proof to the appendix.
3 General Model and Assumptions
Let XA,XB, Y be three random variables and we define prior Q as the joint distribution over
XA,XB, Y . We want to forecast the ground truth Y whose realization is a signal in a finite set Σ.
XA,XB are two sources of information that are related to Y . XA’s realization is a signal in a finite
set ΣA. XB ’s realization is a signal in a finite set ΣB . We may have access to both of the realizations
of XA and XB or only one of them. Thus, we need to learn the relationship between XA,XB and Y
to forecast Y . It’s impossible to learn by only accessing the samples of XA,XB without additional
assumption. We make the following conditional independence assumption:
Assumption 3.1 (Conditional independence). We assume that conditioning on Y , XA, and XB
are independent.
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Intuitively, Y can be seen as the “intersection” between XA and XB. To better understand this
assumption and its limitations we return to our running example where the variable Y is the success
of a start-up. In this case, if both XA and XB contain the sex of the CEO (which we assume is
independent of Y ), then this assumption will not hold. To make it hold, either Y would need to be
redefined to contain the sex of the CEO, or this information would need to be removed from either
XA or XB. For the mechanism design application, if the assumption is violated, for example both
agents are sexists and forecast using the sex of the CEO, then it is impossible to avoid paying them
for this useless/harmful information.
3.1 Well-defined and stable prior
We call Z a solution if conditioning on Z, XA, and XB are independent. Y is a solution. However,
there are a lot of solutions. For example, conditioning on XA or XB, XA and XB are independent,
which means XA and XB are both solutions. Thus, we have an additional restriction on the prior:
well-defined prior and stable prior.
We will need restrictions on the prior when we analyze the strictness of our learning algo-
rithm/mechanism. Readers can skip this section without losing the core idea of our results.
To infer the relationship between Y and XA,XB with only samples of XA,XB, we cannot do
better than to just solve the system of equations (1), given the joint distribution over XA,XB : Q. Our
goal is to obtain the Bayesian posterior predictor. Thus, we list a system that the Bayesian posterior
predictor satisfies. The system below equations involve variables {axA ,bxB ∈ ∆Σ}xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB , and
r ∈ ∆Σ. We insist axAy = Pr[Y = y∣XA = xA], bxBy = Pr[Y = y∣XB = xB] and ry = Pr[Y = y] is a
solution and we call it the desired solution.
S({axA ,bxB}xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB , r) (1)∶={∑
y∈Σ
axAy b
xB
y
ry
−K(XA = xA,XB = xB)}
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB = 0
Claim 2.8 shows the above system has the desired solution.
Note that any permutation of a solution is still a valid solution6. Since we cannot do better than
to solve the above system, if the above system only has one “unique” solution, in the sense that any
two solutions are permuted version of each other, we call the prior Q a well-defined prior. Formally,
Definition 3.2 (Well-defined). A prior Q is well-defined if for any two solutions {axA ,bxB}xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB ,
r and {cxA ,dxB}xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB , r′ of the system of equations (1), there exists a permutation pi ∶ Σ↦ Σ
such that r = pir′ for any xA, xB, axA = picxA, bxB = pidxB .
The well-defined prior exist since intuitively, if ∣ΣA∣ and ∣ΣB ∣ are high and ∣Σ∣ is low, it is likely
Y is the “unique intersection” since the number of constraints of the system will be much greater
than the number of variables.
We say a prior is stable if fixing part of the desired solution of the system (1), in order to make
it still a solution of the system, other parts of the desired solution should also be fixed.
Definition 3.3 (Stable). A prior Q is stable if fixing axAy = Pr[Y = y∣XA = xA] and ry =
Pr[Y = y], the system (1) S({axA ,bxB}xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB , r) = 0 has unique solution bxA such that
bxBy = Pr[Y = y∣XB = xB]; and fixing bxBy = Pr[Y = y∣XB = xB] and ry = Pr[Y = y], the system (1)S({axA ,bxB}xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB , r) = 0 has unique solution axA such that axAy = Pr[Y = y∣XA = xA].
6We may be able to distinguish a solution with its permuted version if we have some side information (e.g. the
prior of Y /a few (xA, xB , y) samples).
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We require stable priors when we design strictly truthful mechanisms.
3.2 Predictors
This section gives the definition of predictors. We have two sets of samples SA ∶= {x`A}`∈LA and
SB ∶= {x`B}`∈LB which are i.i.d samples of XA and XB respectively. For ` ∈ LA ∩LB, (x`A, x`B)s are
i.i.d samples of the joint random variable (XA,XB).
A predictor PA ∶ ΣA ↦ ∆Σ for XA maps xA ∈ Σ to a forecast PA(xA) for ground truth Y . We
similarly define the predictors forXB . We define the Bayesian posterior predictor as the predictor that
maps any input information X = x to its Bayesian posterior forecast for Y = y, i.e., Pr(Y = y∣X = x).
With the conditional independence assumption, we have
Pr[Y ∣XA,XB] =Pr[Y,XA,XB]
Pr[XA,XB]=Pr[Y ]Pr[XA∣Y ]Pr[XB ∣Y ]
Pr[XA,XB] (conditional independence)=Pr[Y ∣XA]Pr[Y ∣XB]
K(XA,XB)Pr[Y ] (K(XA,XB) is the pointwise mutual information.)
When we have access to both the sources where XA = xA and XB = xB, given the prior of the
ground truth Y , we can construct an aggregated forecast for Y = y using PA, PB:
PA(xA)PB(xB)
Pr[Y = y] ⋅ normalization
In this case, if both PA and PB are the Bayesian posterior predictor, the aggregated forecast is
the Bayesian posterior predictor as well. Thus, it’s sufficient to only train PA and PB. In the rest
sections, we will show how to train PA and PB (Section 4), given the two sets of samples SA and
SB, as well as how to incentivize high quality predictors from the crowds (Section 5).
4 Co-training: finding the common ground truth
We have a set of candidates HA for the predictor for XA and a set of candidates HB for the predictor
for XB. We sometimes call each predictor candidate a hypothesis. Given the two sets of samples
SA = {x`A}`∈LA and SB = {x`B}`∈LB , our goal is to figure out the best hypothesis in HA and the best
hypothesis in HB simultaneously. Thus, we need to design proper “loss function” such that the best
hypotheses minimize the loss. In fact, we will show how to design a proper “reward function” such
that the best hypotheses maximize the reward.
4.1 f-mutual information gain
f-mutual information gain MIGf(R) (Figure 3)
Hypothesis We are given HA = {hA ∶ ΣA ↦ ∆Σ}, HB = {hB ∶ ΣB ↦ ∆Σ}: the set of hypothe-
ses/predictor candidates for XA and XB, respectively.
Gain Given reward function R ∶ ∆Σ ×∆Σ ↦ R,
for each ` ∈ LA ∩LB , reward “the amount of agreement” between the two predictor candidates’
predictions for task `, i.e.,
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R(hA(x`A), hB(x`B));
for each distinct pair (`A, `B), `A ∈ LA, `B ∈ LB, `A ≠ `B , punish both predictor candidates “the
amount of agreement” between their predictions for a pair of distinct tasks (`A, `B), i.e.,
f⋆(R(hA(x`AA ), hB(x`BB )).
The f -mutual information gain MIGf(R) that is corresponding to the reward function R is
MIGf(R(hA, hB))∣SA,SB = 1∣LA ∩LB ∣ ∑`∈LA∩LBR(hA(x`A), hB(x`B))− 1∣LA∣∣LB ∣ − ∣LA ∩LB ∣2 ∑`A∈LA,`B∈LB ,`A≠`B f⋆(R(hA(x`AA ), hB(x`BB )))
Lemma 4.1. The expected total f-mutual information gain is maximized over all possible R, hA,
and hB if and only if for any (xA, xB) ∈ ΣA ×ΣB,
R(hA(xA), hB(xB)) ∈ ∂f(K(xA, xB)).
The maximum is MIf(XA;XB).
Proof. (x`A, x`B)` are i.i.d. realizations of (XA,XB). Therefore, the expected f -mutual information
gain is EUXA,XBR −EVXA,XB f⋆(R). The results follow from Lemma 2.6.
Although any reward function corresponds to an f -mutual information gain function, we need to
properly design the reward function R such that, fixing R, there exist hypotheses to maximize the
corresponding f -mutual information gain MIGf(R) to the f -mutual information between the two
sources. We will use the intuition from Lemma 4.1 to design such reward functions R in the next
section.
4.2 Maximizing the f-mutual information gain
In this section, we will construct a special reward function Rf and then show that the maximizers of
the corresponding f -mutual information gain MIGf(Rf) are the Bayesian posterior predictors.
Definition 4.2 (Rf ). We define reward function Rf as a function that maps the two hypotheses’
outputs p1,p2 ∈ ∆Σ and the vector p ∈ ∆Σ to
Rf(p1,p2,p) ∶= g(∑
y
p1(y)p2(y)
p(y) )
where g(t) ∈ ∂f(t),∀t. When f is differentiable,
Rf(p1,p2,p) ∶= f ′(∑
y
p1(y)p2(y)
p(y) ).
With this definition of the reward function, fixing p ∈ ∆Σ which can be seen as the prior over Y ,
the “amount of agreement” between two predictions p1,p2 are an increasing function g of
∑
y
p1(y)p2(y)
p(y) ,
which is intuitive and reasonable. The increasing function g is the derivative of the convex function
f . By carefully choosing convex function f , we can use any increasing function g here.
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Example 4.3. Here we present some examples of the f -mutual information gain MIGf(Rf) with
reward function Rf , associated with different f -divergences. We use Table 1 as reference for ∂f(⋅)
and f⋆(∂f(⋅)).
Total variation distance:
1∣LA ∩LB ∣ ∑`∈LA∩LB sign(log[∑y hA(x
`
A)(y)hB(x`B)(y)
p(y) ])
− 1∣LA∣∣LB ∣ − ∣LA ∩LB ∣2 ∑`A∈LA,`B∈LB ,`A≠`B sign(log[∑y hA(x
`A
A )(y)hB(x`BB )(y)
p(y) ])
KL divergence:
1∣LA ∩LB ∣ ∑`∈LA∩LB (1 + log[∑y hA(x
`
A)(y)hB(x`B)(y)
p(y) ])
− 1∣LA∣∣LB ∣ − ∣LA ∩LB ∣2 ∑`A∈LA,`B∈LB ,`A≠`B (∑y hA(x
`A
A )(y)hB(x`BB )(y)
p(y) )
Pearson:
1∣LA ∩LB ∣ ∑`∈LA∩LB 2 ∗ (∑y hA(x
`
A)(y)hB(x`B)(y)
p(y) − 1)
− 1∣LA∣∣LB ∣ − ∣LA ∩LB ∣2 ∑`A∈LA,`B∈LB ,`A≠`B ((∑y hA(x
`A
A )(y)hB(x`BB )(y)
p(y) )2 − 1)
Theorem 4.4. With the conditional independent assumption on XA,XB, Y , given the samples
SA, SB, given a convex function f , we define the optimization goal as the expected f-mutual infor-
mation gain with reward function Rf , i.e.,
MIGf(hA, hB,p) ∶= EXA,XBMIGf(Rf(hA, hB,p))∣SA,SB
and optimize over all possible hypotheses hA ∶ ΣA ↦ ∆Σ, hB ∶ ΣB ↦ ∆Σ and distribution vectors
p ∈ ∆Σ. We have
Solution→Maximizer: any solution Z corresponds to a maximizer of MIGf(hA, hB,p)7: for any
solution Z,
h∗A(xA) ∶= (Pr[Z = y∣XA = xA])y h∗B(xB) ∶= (Pr[Z = y∣XB = xB])y8
and the prior over Z, Pr[Z = y]y, is the maximizer of MIGf(hA, hB,p) and the maximum is
MIf(XA;XB);
7Given the prior over Y , we can fix p as the prior over Y . Without knowing the prior over Y , p becomes a variable
of the optimization goal and helps us learn the prior over Y .
8Recall that we use (φ(y))y∈[N] to represent the vector (φ(1), φ(2), ..., φ(N)) ∈ RN .
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Maximizer→(Permuted) Ground truth when the prior is well-defined, f is differentiable, and
f ′ is invertible, any maximizer of MIGf(hA, hB,p) corresponds to the (possibly permuted)
ground truth Y : for any maximizer (h∗A(⋅), h∗B(⋅),p∗) of MIGf(hA, hB,p), there exists a
permutation pi such that
h∗A(xA) ∶= (Pr[pi(Y ) = y∣XA = xA])y h∗B(xB) ∶= (Pr[pi(Y ) = y∣XB = xB])y
and p∗ = Pr[pi(Y ) = y]y.
The above theorem neither investigates computation complexity (which may be affected by the
choice of f), data requirements, nor the choice of the hypothesis class for practical implementation
(see Section 7 for more discussion).
Proof for Theorem 4.4. Lemma 4.1 shows that the expected f -mutual information gain is maximized
if and only if for any (xA, xB),
Rf(h∗A(xA), h∗B(xB),p∗) ∈ ∂f(K(xA, xB)).
(1) Solution→Maximizer: For any solution Z, we can construct
h∗A(xA) ∶= (Pr[Z = y∣XA = xA])y h∗B(xB) ∶= (Pr[Z = y∣XB = xB])y
and p∗ = Pr[Z = y]y. Then
Rf(h∗A(xA), h∗B(xB),p∗) ∈ ∂f(∑
y
Pr[Z = y∣XA = xA]Pr[Z = y∣XB = xB]
Pr[Z = y] )= ∂f(K(xA, xB) (Claim 2.8)
Thus, based on Lemma 4.1, any solution Z corresponds to a maximizer of the optimization goal.
(2)Maximizer→(Permuted) Ground truth: For any maximizer (h∗A(⋅), h∗B(⋅),p∗) of the optimiza-
tion goal, when f is differentiable, Lemma 4.1 shows that
Rf(h∗A(xA), h∗B(xB),p∗) = f ′(K(xA, xB)).
When f ′ is invertible, we have
∑
y
h∗A(xA)(y)h∗B(xB)(y)
p∗(y) =K(xA, xB)
for all xA, xB.
Thus, {(h∗A(xA), h∗B(xB),p∗)}xA,xB is actually the solution of the system (1). When the prior is
well-defined, there exists a permutation pi such that
h∗A(xA) ∶= (Pr[pi(Y ) = y∣XA = xA])y h∗B(xB) ∶= (Pr[pi(Y ) = y∣XB = xB])y
and p∗ = Pr[pi(Y ) = y]y where Y is the ground truth.
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5 Forecast elicitation without verification
This section considers the setting where the forecasts are provided by the crowds and we want to
incentivize high quality forecast by providing an instant reward without instant access to the ground
truth.
There is a forecasting task. Alice and Bob have private information XA,XB = xA ∈ ΣA, xB ∈ ΣB
correspondingly and are asked to forecast the ground truth Y = y. We denote (Pr[Y = y∣XA = xA])y,(Pr[Y = y∣XB = xB])y by pxA , pxB correspondingly. Alice and Bob are asked to report their
Bayesian forecast pxA , pxB . We denote their actual reports by pˆxA and pˆxB . Without access to
the realization of Y , we want to incentivize both Alice and Bob play truth-telling strategies, i.e.,
honestly reporting their forecast pxA , pxB for Y .
We define the strategy of Alice as a mapping sA from xA (private signal) to a probability
distribution over the space of all possible forecast for random variable Y . Analogously, we define
Bob’s strategy sB . Note that essentially each (possibly mixed) strategy sA can be seen as a (possibly
random) predictor PA where PA(xA) is a random forecast drawn from distribution sA(xA). In
particular, the truthful strategy corresponds to the Bayesian posterior predictor.
We say agents play a permutation strategy profile if there exists permutation pi ∶ Σ↦ Σ such that
each agent always reports pip given her truthful report is p.
Note that without any side information about Y , we cannot distinguish the scenario where agents
are honest and the scenario where agents play a permutation strategy profile. Thus, it is too much
to ask truth-telling to be strictly better than any other strategy profile. The focal property defined
in the following paragraph is the optimal property we can obtain.
Mechanism Design Goals
(Strictly) Truthful Mechanism M is (strictly) truthful if truth-telling is a (strict) equilibrium.
Focal MechanismM is focal if it is strictly truthful and each agent’s expected payment is maximized
if agents tell the truth; moreover, when agents play a non-permutation strategy profile, each
agent’s expected payment is strictly less.
We consider two settings:
Multi-task Each agent is assigned several independent a priori similar forecasting tasks in a random
order and is asked to report her forecast for each task.
Single-task All agents are asked to report their forecast for the same single task.
In the single-task setting, it’s impossible to design focal mechanisms since agents can collaborate
to pick an arbitrary y∗ ∈ Σ and pretend that they know Y = y∗. However, we will show we can design
strictly truthful mechanism in the single-task setting. In the multi-task setting, since agents may
be assigned different tasks and the tasks show in random order, they cannot collaborate to pick an
arbitrary y∗ ∈ Σ for each task. In fact, we will show if the number of tasks is greater or equal to 2,
we can design a family of focal mechanisms.
Achieving the focal goal in the multi-task setting is very similar to what we did in finding
the common ground truth. Note that in the forecast elicitation problem, incentivizing a truthful
strategy is equivalent to incentivizing the Bayesian posterior predictor. Thus, we can directly use the
f -mutual information gain as the reward in the multi-task setting. Achieving the strictly truthful
goal in the single-task setting is more tricky and we will return to it later.
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5.1 Multi-task: focal forecast elicitation without verification
We assume Alice is assigned tasks set LA and Bob is assigned tasks set LB. For each task `, Alice’s
private information is x`A and Bob’s private information is x
`
B. The ground truth of this task is y
`.
Multi-task common ground mechanism MCG(f) Given the prior distribution over Y , a
convex and differentiable function f whose convex conjugate is f⋆,
Report for each task ` ∈ LA, Alice is asked to report pxA` ∶= (Pr[Y = y∣x`A])y; for each task ` ∈ LB ,
Bob is asked to report pxB` ∶= (Pr[Y = y∣x`B])y. We denote their actual reports by pˆ`xA` and
pˆ`
xB`
.
Payment For each ` ∈ LA ∩LB, reward both Alice and Bob “the amount of agreement” between
their forecast in task `, i.e.,
R(pˆ`xA` , pˆ`xB`);
for each pair of distinct tasks (`A, `B), `A ∈ LA, `B ∈ LB, `A ≠ `B, punish both Alice and Bob
“the amount of agreement” between their forecast in distinct tasks (`A, `B), i.e.,
f⋆(R(pˆ`A
xA
`A
, pˆ`B
xB
`B
).
In total, both Alice and Bob are paid
1∣LA ∩LB ∣ ∑`∈LA∩LBR(pˆ`xA` , pˆ`xB`)− 1∣LA∣∣LB ∣ − ∣LA ∩LB ∣2 ∑`A∈LA,`B∈LB ,`A≠`B f⋆(R(pˆ`AxA`A , pˆ`BxB`B )
where
R(p1,p2) ∶= f ′(∑
y
p1(y)p2(y)
Pr[Y = y] ).
We do not want agents to collaborate with each other based on the index of the task or other
information in addition to the private information. Thus, we make the following assumption to
guarantee the index of the task is meaningless for all agents.
Assumption 5.1 (A priori similar and random order). For each task `, fresh i.i.d. realizations of(XA,XB, Y ) = (x`A, x`B, y`) are generated. All tasks appear in a random order, independently drawn
for each agent.
Theorem 5.2. With the conditional independence assumption, and a priori similar and random
order assumption, when the prior Q is stable and well-defined, given the prior distribution over the
Y , given a differential convex function f whose derivative f ′ is invertible, if max{∣LA∣, ∣LB ∣} ≥ 2,
then MCG(f) is focal.
When both Alice and Bob are honest, each of them’s expected payment in MCG(f) is
MIf(XA;XB).
The non-negativity of MIf implies that agents are willing to participate in the mechanism. Like
Theorem 4.4, in order to show Theorem 5.2, we need to first introduce a lemma which is very similar
to Lemma 4.1.
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Lemma 5.3. With the conditional independence assumption, the expected total payment is maximized
over Alice and Bob’s strategies if and only if ∀`1 ∈ LA, `2 ∈ LB, for any (x`1A , x`2B ) ∈ ΣA ×ΣB,
R(pˆ`1
xA
`1
, pˆ`2
xB
`2
) = f ′(K(x`1A , x`2B )).
The maximum is MIf(XA;XB).
The proofs of Lemma 5.3 and Theorem 5.2 are very similar with Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.4.
We defer the formal proofs to the appendix.
5.2 Single-task: strictly truthful forecast elicitation without verification
This section introduces the strictly truthful mechanism in the single-task setting. If we know the
realization y of Y , we can simply apply a proper scoring rule and pay Alice and Bob PS(y, pˆxA)
and PS(y, pˆxB) respectively. Then according to the property of the proper scoring rule, Alice and
Bob will honestly report their truthful forecast to maximize their expected payment. However, we
do not know the realization of Y . In the information elicitation without verification setting where
Alice and Bob are required to report their information, Miller et al. [27] propose the “peer prediction”
idea, that is, pays Alice the accuracy of the forecast that predicts Bob’s information conditioning
Alice’s information, i.e.,
PS(xˆB, (Pr[XB = xB ∣xˆA])y)
where xˆA and xˆB are Alice and Bob’s reported information. We note the peer prediction mechanism
in Miller et al. [27] is truthful. With a similar “peer prediction” idea, we propose a strictly truthful
mechanism in forecast elicitation.
Common ground mechanism Given the prior distribution over Y ,
Report Alice and Bob are required to report pxA , pxB . We denote their actual reports by pˆxA and
pˆxB .
Payment Both Alice and Bob are paid
log∑
y
pˆxA(y)pˆxB(y)
Pr[Y = y] .
Theorem 5.4. With the conditional independence assumption (and when the prior is stable), given
the prior distribution over the Y , the common ground mechanism is (strictly) truthful;
moreover, when both Alice and Bob are honest, each of them’s expected payment in the common
ground mechanism is the Shannon mutual information between their private information
I(XA;XB) =MIKL(XA;XB).
The non-negativity of the Shannon mutual information implies that agents are willing to
participate in the mechanism. The (strictly) truthful property of the common ground mechanism is
proved by the fact that log scoring rule LSR is strictly proper.
Proof. When both Alice and Bob are honest, their payment is logK(xA, xB) according to Claim 2.8.
Their expected payment will be
∑
xA,xB
Pr[xA, xB] logK(xA, xB) = ∑
xA,xB
Pr[xA, xB] log Pr[xA, xB]
Pr[xA]Pr[xB] =MIKL(XA;XB)
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Given that Bob honestly reports pˆxB = pxB , we would like to show that the expected payment of
Alice is less than MIKL(XA;XB) regardless of the strategy Alice plays. The expected payment of
Alice is
∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA,XB = xB] log∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y]
= ∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA,XB = xB] log∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y] Pr[XB = xB]− ∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA,XB = xB] log Pr[XB = xB]
= ∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA,XB = xB] log∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y] Pr[XB = xB] −C
(C is a constant that does not depend on Alice’s strategy)
= ∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA]Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA] log∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y] Pr[XB = xB] −C
Moreover, fixing XA = xA
∑
xB
∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y] Pr[XB = xB]
=∑
xB
∑
y
pˆxA(y)Pr[XB = xB, Y = y]
Pr[Y = y]=∑
xB
∑
y
pˆxA(y)Pr[XB = xB ∣Y = y]
=∑
y
pˆxA(y) = 1
Thus, ∑y pˆxA(y)pxB (y)Pr[Y =y] Pr[XB = xB] can be seen as a forecast for XB = xB. Since LSR(p,q) =∑σ p(σ) logq(σ) ≤ ∑σ p(σ) logp(σ) = LSR(p,p) for any p,q ∈ ∆Σ, we have
∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA]Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA] log∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y] Pr[XB = xB] −C (2)≤ ∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA]Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA] log Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA] −C
= ∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA]Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA] log Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA]
− ∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA,XB = xB] log Pr[XB = xB]
= ∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA,XB = xB] log Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA]
Pr[XB = xB]=I(XA;XB)
The non-negativity of the Shannon mutual information implies that agents are willing to
participate in the mechanism.
It remains to analyze the strictness of the truthfulness. We need to show for any xA, given that
Alice receives XA = xA, she will obtain strictly less payment via reporting pˆxA ≠ pxA .
19
Given that Alice receives XA = xA, her expected payment is
∑
xB
Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA] log∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y] Pr[XB = xB] −C (see equation (2))≤∑
xB
Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA] log Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA] −C (3)
Note that ∑σ p(σ) logq(σ) < ∑σ p(σ) logp(σ) when q ≠ p. When the prior is stable, since
pˆxA ≠ pxA , then pxB , pˆxA , (Pr[Y = y])y is not the solution of system (1). This implies that there
exists xB such that
Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA] ≠∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y] Pr[XB = xB].
Thus, the inequality (3) must be strict. Therefore, when the prior is stable, the common ground
mechanism is strictly truthful.
6 PS-gain
In this section, we will extend the maximum likelihood estimator method in Raykar et al. [35] to a
general family of optimization goals—PS-gain and compare the general family with our f -mutual
information gain. We will see the application of PS-gain requires either one of the information
sources to be low dimensional or that we have a simple generative model for the distribution over
one of the information sources and ground truth label. Thus, the range of applications of PS-gain is
more limited compared with the range of applications of f -mutual information gain.
In Raykar et al. [35], XA is a feature vector which has multiple crowdsourced labels XB. We
have access to (x`A, x`B)`∈L which are i.i.d samples of (XA,XB). Raykar et al. [35] also have the
conditional independence assumption.
6.1 Maximum likelihood estimator (MLE)
Let ΘA,ΘB be two parameters that control the distribution over XA and Y and the distribution
over XB and Y respectively.
With the conditional independence assumption, we have
log Pr[(x`A, x`B)`∈L∣ΘA,ΘB] = log Π`∈LPr[XB = x`B ∣XA = x`A,ΘA,ΘB]= log Π`∈L∑
y
Pr[XB = x`B ∣Y = y,ΘB]Pr[Y = y∣XA = x`A,ΘA]
= ∑`∈L log(∑y Pr[XB = x`B ∣Y = y,ΘB]Pr[Y = y∣XA = x`A,ΘA])
The MLE is a pair of parameters Θ∗A,Θ∗B that maximizes the expected
log Pr[(x`A, x`B)`∈L∣ΘA,ΘB] = ∑`∈L log(∑y Pr[XB = x`B ∣Y = y,ΘB]Pr[Y = y∣XA = x`A,ΘA]).
Raykar et al. [35] use the MLE to estimate the parameters. In order to compare this MLE method
with our f -mutual information gain framework, we map this MLE method into our language and
provide a theoretical analysis for the condition when MLE is meaningful.
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LSR-gain/MLE
Hypothesis We are given HA = {hA ∶ ΣA ↦∆Σ}, VB = {vB ∶ ΣB ↦ [0,1]∣Σ∣}: the set of hypotheses
candidates for XA and XB, respectively. Note that vB maps xB ∈ ΣB into a vector in [0,1]∣Σ∣
rather than a distribution vector.
Gain We see (vB(xB) ⋅ hA(x`A))xB
as a forecast for random variable XB conditioning on XA = x`A and we reward the hypotheses
LSR-gain—the accuracy of this forecast via log scoring rule (LSR):
∑`∈LLSR(x`B, (vB(xB) ⋅ hA(x`A))xB) = ∑`∈L log(vB(x`B) ⋅ hA(x`A))
We use v ⋅ v′ to represent the dot product between two vectors.
Note that by picking HA as the set of mappings—associated with a set of parameters {ΘA}—that
map XA = xA to (Pr[Y = y∣XA = x`A,ΘA])y and picking VB as the set of mappings—associated with
a set of parameters {ΘB}—that map XB = xB to (Pr[XB = xB ∣Y = y,ΘB])y, maximizing LSR-gain
is equivalent to obtaining MLE.
The idea of LSR-gain is very similar with the original peer prediction idea introduced in
Section 5.2 as well as our common ground mechanism.
Theorem 6.1. When ∑xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1,1, ..,1) for all vB ∈ VB, the ground truth Y corresponds
to a maximizer of LSR-gain:
v∗B(xB) = (Pr[XB = xB ∣Y = y])y h∗A(xA) = (Pr[Y = y∣XA = xA])y.
The maximum is the conditional Shannon entropy H(XB ∣XA).
Remark 6.2. Note that without the restriction: ∑xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1,1, ..,1) for all vB ∈ VB,
v∗B(xB) = (Pr[XB = xB ∣Y = y])y h∗A(xA) = (Pr[Y = y∣XA = xA])y
is not a maximizer and we will have a meaningless maximizer vB(xB) = (1, 1, .., 1),∀xB and hA(xA) =(1,0, ...,0),∀xA.
By picking VB as the set of mappings—associated with a set of parameters {ΘB}—that map
XB = xB to (Pr[XB = xB ∣Y = y,ΘB])y, the restriction ∑xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1,1, ..,1) for all vB ∈ VB
satisfies naturally. However, it requires the knowledge of the generative distribution model over
XB and Y with parameter ΘB. Raykar et al. [35] assume a simple distribution model between XB
and Y with parameter ΘB—conditioning the ground truth label, the crowdsourced feedback XB is
drawn from a binomial distribution, such that Pr[XB = xB ∣Y = y,ΘB] has a simple explicit form.
Proof of Theorem 6.1.
E ∑`∈L log(vB(x`B) ⋅ hA(x`A))= ∑
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB Pr[XA = xA,XB = xB] log(vB(xB) ⋅ hA(xA))
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= ∑
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB Pr[XA = xA]Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA] log(vB(xB) ⋅ hA(xA))
= ∑
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB Pr[XA = xA]LSR((Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA])xB , (vB(xB) ⋅ hA(xA))xB)
Fixing XA = xA, since ∑xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1,1, ...,1) for all vB ∈ VB, we have
∑
xB
(vB(xB) ⋅ hA(xA)) =∑
y
hA(xA)(y) = 1
Since LSR(p,q) ≤ LSR(p,p) for any p,q ∈ ∆Σ, we have
E ∑`∈L log(vB(xB) ⋅ hA(xA))= ∑
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB Pr[XA = xA]LSR((Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA])xB , (vB(xB) ⋅ hA(xA))xB)
≤ ∑
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB Pr[XA = xA]LSR((Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA])xB , (Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA])xB)= ∑
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB Pr[XA = xA]Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA] log Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA]=H(XB ∣XA)
= ∑
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB Pr[XA = xA]Pr[XB = xB ∣XA = xA] log(∑y Pr[XB = xB ∣Y = y]Pr[Y = y∣XA = xA])
(conditional independence)
Thus,
v∗B(xB) = (Pr[XB = xB ∣Y = y])y h∗A(xA) = (Pr[Y = y∣XA = xA])y
is a maximizer and the maximum is the conditional Shannon entropy H(XB ∣XA).
6.2 Extending LSR-gain to PS-gain
The property LSR(p,q) = ∑σ p(σ) logq(σ) ≤ ∑σ p(σ) logp(σ) = LSR(p,p) for any p,q ∈ ∆Σ is
also valid for all proper scoring rules. Thus, we can naturally extend the MLE to PS-gain by
replacing the LSR by any given proper scoring rule PS.
PS-gain
Hypothesis We are given HA = {hA ∶ ΣA ↦∆Σ}, VB = {vB ∶ ΣB ↦ [0,1]∣Σ∣}: the set of hypotheses
candidates for XA and XB, respectively.
Gain We see (vB(xB) ⋅ hA(x`A))xB
as a forecast for random variable XB conditioning on XA = x`A and we reward the hypotheses
PS-gain—the accuracy of this forecast via a given proper scoring rule PS:
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∑`∈LPS(x`B, (vB(xB) ⋅ hA(x`A))xB)
Note that the general PS-gain may involve the calculations of (vB(xB) ⋅ hA(x`A))xB while LSR-
gain only requires the value of vB(x`B) ⋅ hA(x`A). Thus, unlike LSR-gain, the general PS-gain may
be only applicable for low dimensional XB , even if we assume a simple generative distribution model
over XB and Y .
Theorem 6.3. Given a proper scoring rule PS, when ∑xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1, 1, ..., 1) for all vB ∈ VB,
the ground truth Y corresponds to a PS-gain maximizer:
v∗B(xB) = (Pr[XB = xB ∣Y = y])y h∗A(xA) = (Pr[Y = y∣XA = xA])y.
The proof is the same with Theorem 6.1 except that we replace LSR(p,q) ≤ LSR(p,p) by
PS(p,q) ≤ PS(p,p) for any p,q ∈ ∆Σ.
6.3 Comparing PS-gain with f-mutual information gain
Generally, f -mutual information gain can be applied to a more general setting.
PS-gain requires the restriction ∑xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1,1, ...,1) for all vB ∈ VB. Thus, PS-gain
requires the full knowledge of vB for all vB ∈ VB to check whether it satisfies the restriction, while for
the f -mutual information gain, it is sufficient to just have the access to the outputs of the hypothesis:{hB(x`B)}`∈LB . Therefore, in the mechanism design part, we can only use f -mutual information gain
to design focal mechanisms since we only have the outputs from agents.
Moreover, ∑xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1, 1, ..., 1) is also hard to check when ∣ΣB ∣ is very large. For example,
when xB is a 100×100 black-and-white image, ∣ΣB ∣ = 2100 and checking ∑xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1, 1, ..., 1)
requires 2100 time. Normalizing vB such that it satisfies the condition also requires 2100 time.
Thus, when ∣ΣB ∣ is very large, we need a simple generative distribution model between XB and
Y with parameter ΘB such that we can pick VB as the set of mappings—associated with a set
of parameters {ΘB}—that map XB = xB to (Pr[XB = xB ∣Y = y,ΘB])y, to make the restriction∑xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1,1, ..,1) for all vB ∈ VB satisfy naturally. When we have the simple generative
distribution model, we can use LSR-gain. The general PS-gain involves the calculations of the∣ΣB ∣ dimensional vector—(vB(xB) ⋅ hA(x`A))xB—for each x`A. Thus, the general PS-gain is only
applicable to low dimensional XB.
In the learning with noisy labels problem, the distribution between XB and Y can be represented
by a simple transition matrix and XB is low dimensional. Therefore, both PS-gain and f -mutual
information gain can be applied to the learning with noisy labels problem.
Therefore, the application of PS-gain requires either one of the information sources to be low
dimensional or that we have a simple generative model for the distribution over one of the information
sources and ground truth label, while f -mutual information gain does not have the restrictions.
7 Conclusion and discussion
We build a natural connection between mechanism design and machine learning by addressing
two related problems: (1) co-training: learning to forecast ground truth using two conditionally
independent sources, without access to labeled data; (2) forecast elicitation: eliciting high quality
forecasts from the crowds without verification, by the same information theoretic approach.
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For the co-training problem, as usual in the related literature, we reduce the problem to an
optimization problem and do not investigate the computation complexity or the data requirements.
To implement our f -mutual information gain framework in practice, we implicitly assume that for
high dimensional XA,XB, there exists a trainable set of hypotheses (e.g. neural networks) that is
sufficiently rich to contain the Bayesian posterior predictor but not everything to cause over-fitting.
The most apparent empirical direction will be running experiments on real data by training two
neural networks to test our algorithms. Interesting theoretic directions include the analysis of the
Bayesian risk and the influence of the choice of the convex function f on the convergence rate.
For forecast elicitation, the most apparent direction will be performing real-world experiments.
To apply our mechanisms, we do not need that every two agents’ information is conditionally
independent. In fact, for each agent, we only need to find a single reference agent for her such
that the reference agent’s information is conditionally independent of hers. Then we can run our
mechanisms on the agent and her reference agent. In practice, we can pair the agents with some
side information and make sure each pair of agents’ information is conditionally independent.
Another interesting direction is to ensure fairness, in particular, that agents are not incentivized
to coordinate on stereotypes. One solution, is suppressing information from some of the agents and
using our framework. However, when this is not possible, the prior peer prediction work on cheap
signals [15, 22] may be helpful in addressing this issue.
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A Additional proof(s)
Claim 2.8. When random variables XA, XB are independent conditioning on Y ,
K(XA = xA,XB = xB) =∑
y
Pr[Y = y]K(XA = xA, Y = y)K(XB = xB, Y = y)
=∑
y
Pr[Y = y∣XA = xA]K(XB = xB, Y = y)
=∑
y
Pr[Y = y∣XA = xA]Pr[Y = y∣XB = xB]
Pr[Y = y] .
Proof.
K(XA = xA,XB = xB) = Pr[XA = xA,XB = xB]
Pr[XA = xA]Pr[XB = xB]=∑y Pr[Y = y]Pr[XA = xA,XB = xB ∣Y = y]
Pr[XA = xA]Pr[XB = xB]=∑y Pr[Y = y]Pr[XA = xA∣Y = y]Pr[XB = xB ∣Y = y]
Pr[XA = xA]Pr[XB = xB]
(Conditional independence)=∑
y
Pr[Y = y]K(XA = xA, Y = y)K(XB = xB, Y = y)
(PMI=posterior/prior)=∑
y
Pr[Y = y∣XA = xA]K(XB = xB, Y = y)
=∑
y
Pr[Y = y∣XA = xA]Pr[Y = y∣XB = xB]
Pr[Y = y] .
Theorem 5.2. Given the prior distribution over the Y , with the conditional independence assumption,
with a priori similar and random order assumption, when max{∣LA∣, ∣LB ∣} ≥ 2 and the prior is stable
and well-defined, when the convex function f is differentiable and f ′ is invertible, MCG(f) is focal.
When both Alice and Bob are honest, each of them’s expected payment in MCG(f) is
MIf(XA;XB).
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Proof. Given that Alice’s strategy is sA and Bob’s strategy is sB, with the a priori similar and
random order assumption, we represent agents’ report as the output (possibly being random) of
their strategy operating on the private information.
We start to show MCG(f) is strictly truthful. Given that Alice is honest, based on Lemma 5.3,
Bob will maximize his expected payment if and only if ∀`1, `2,
R(pxA`1 , sB(x`2B )) = f ′(K(x`1A , x`2B )).
Note that in MCG(f),
R(pxA`1 , sB(x`2B )) = f ′(∑
y
pxA`1 (y)sB(x`2B )(y)
Pr[Y = y] )
Since the prior is stable, the above equation is satisfied for all possible xA`1 if and only if Bob
tells the truth, i.e., reporting pxB`2 . Therefore, MCG(f) is strictly truthful.
It remains to show MCG(f) pays truth-telling the most and strictly better than any other
non-permutation strategy profile. When agents maximize the expected payment,
R(sA(xA`1), sB(x`2B )) = f ′(K(x`1A , x`2B )).
Recall that we defined
R(sA(xA`1), sB(x`2B )) = f ′(∑
y
sA(xA`1)(y)sB(x`2B )(y)
Pr[Y = y] ).
Thus, when f ′ is invertible, we have
∑
y
sA(xA`1)(y)sB(x`2B )(y)
Pr[Y = y] =K(x`1A , x`2B )
for any x`1A , x
`2
B . This is exactly system (1).
With the conditional independence assumption, when agents tell the truth, the above system
will be satisfied. Therefore, agents can maximize their expected payment via truth-telling. The
non-negativity of MIf implies that agents are willing to participate in the mechanism.
Moreover, when the prior is well-defined, if the prior Pr[Y ] is a uniform distribution, then any
permutation strategy profile can solve the above system and as well as maximize agents’ expected
payment. Even if the prior Pr[Y ] is not a uniform distribution, although not all permutation
strategy profiles solve the above system, still any solution of the above system must correspond to
a permutation strategy profile, given the prior is well-defined. Therefore, when agents maximize
their expected payment, their strategy profile must be a permutation strategy profile or truth-telling,
which implies MCG(f) is focal.
Lemma 5.3. With the conditional independence assumption, the expected total payment is maximized
over Alice and Bob’s strategies if and only if ∀`1 ∈ LA, `2 ∈ LB, for any (x`1A , x`2B ) ∈ ΣA ×ΣB,
R(pˆ`1
xA
`1
, pˆ`2
xB
`2
) = f ′(K(x`1A , x`2B )).
The maximum is
MIf(XA;XB).
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Proof. Without loss of generality, it is sufficient to analyze Alice’s strategy and report. With the a
priori similar and random order assumption, pˆ`1
xA
`1
can be represented as sA(xA`1) since the index
of the task `1 is meaningless to Alice when all tasks appear in a random order, independently drawn
for each agent. The strategy can be seen as a random predictor. Thus, we can use the same proof of
Lemma 4.1 to prove Lemma 5.3.
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